The Case
for Price Discrimination
by Tim Smith, PhD, 3 March 2004
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It is a simple fact: different customers will place
different values on your offering. Some will greatly value your
product or service while others will value it less. There is little
to profit in driving all customers towards a homogeneous demand
level, but there is much to profit in taking advantage of the heterogeneity
in demand. Correctly constructed, the pricing mechanism can use
heterogeneity in demand to improve revenues and profits, even in
highly competitive industries.
The approach to pricing for many companies is that
of a price taker in a commodity market. The executives of the business
feel that their price is determined by competitive offerings and
suspect customers view the offering is viewed as a commodity. While
competition may limit the room for price discrimination, it rarely
removes all price flexibility.
Price discrimination is often defined as charging
different customers different prices for the same or highly similar
offering. Left with this definition, it is easy to conclude that
price discrimination is an unfair market practice. After all, why
should one customer pay more for that same product than the next
customer? Based solely on this question, price discrimination would
be unfair. However, additional relevant questions can be raised.
Furthermore, price discrimination can be not only fair, but by the
high prevalence of this mechanism in markets, we can suspect it
is a best practice.
The variability in value that customers derive from
a product or service leads to a variability in consumer surplus,
wherein consumer surplus is defined as the value that a customer
receives over the price that they pay for the offering. Price discrimination
will recapture some of the excess consumer surplus from customers
who value the offering highly and transfer that consumer surplus
to the providing business. That business will directly see that
recaptured consumer surplus in improved profitability. Viewed in
this manner, it is appropriate for the price for a good or service
correctly reflect a fair brokerage of profit sharing between the
consumer surplus and the business’s profits.
A secondary value of price discrimination is that
it awakens a business to the opportunity of serving customers that
don’t value the offering as highly but would like to purchase
if prices were lower. Price discrimination mechanisms that enable
the minimum price charged to be lowered can improve market participation
to include new customer sets that would otherwise be priced out
of the market. This larger market opening can be used to improve
capacity utilization or, in the case of intellectual property, improve
the value that the intellectual property provides to society.
There are many examples of price discrimination that
perform the effect of improving profits and enlarging the market
served. We can see this simply by considering three industries:
automobile manufacturers, airlines, and software.
US automobile manufactures are encouraged by the government
to price discriminate through the CAFE Standards mechanism. CAFE
Standards, or Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency Standards, require
that the combined fleet of passenger cars sold in the US by any
one manufacturer has an average fuel efficiency of 27.5 mpg, and
the CAFE Standard for light trucks (which includes SUVs) is 20.7
mpg. To encourage the right mixture of large, fuel guzzling, luxury
and sports cars with small, fuel miserly, cars; automobile manufactures
will raise the prices on large cars above an even profit margin
ratio and lower the prices on small cars below an even profit ratio.
In effect, CAFE Standards encourage automobile manufacturers to
use price discrimination to enable large cars sales to subsidize
the sale of small cars.
Industries will also use price discrimination without
the encouragement of federal regulation. Airlines regularly vary
the prices on for identical seats according to their expected sales
for a given city-pair at a given departure time. Flights at unpopular
times for unpopular city-pairs will have more lowest-fare seats
while flights for popular times between popular city-pairs will
have fewer lowest-fare seats and more full-fare seats. From the
airline’s perspective, it derives the value from providing
a wide variety of city-pairs with a wide variety of departure times
to attract the flexibility starved business customer. Low fare seats
are sold to improve overall flight profitability on an otherwise
fixed cost city-pair departure time offering. In effect, price discrimination
enables airlines to offer greater value in the form of flexibility
to high-value business customers and offer greater value to low-value
bargain seekers in the form of low prices.
In the software industry too, success is highly dependent
upon price discrimination. In terms of underlying software infrastructure,
there may be high similarity between a back office system sold to
a billion dollar company and the same sold to a company with a few
hundred million in revenue. However, the cost of the same back office
system will vary widely between these two companies. Not only does
the larger company derive greater value from the back office system,
but their ability to pay will also be greater. Smaller companies
benefit from the strenuous demands for functionality placed by larger
companies in receiving a back office system that provides greater
benefits, in effect receiving greater value than that which the
market would provide in the absence of large company customers.
From the above three examples, price discrimination
plays an important role in brokering a fair deal between production
and demand, and expanding the market for the output of production.
Mathematically, it can even be shown that price discrimination
can increase revenues and overall consumer surplus. Consider a hypothetical
market where overall demand increases at half the rate in which
price decreases. For the first unit, a customer is willing to pay
$200 thousand while for the 100th unit, a customer is willing to
pay only $2 thousand. With only one-price for the entire market,
the best price is at $100 thousand wherein half the market will
purchase and half the market will avoid the offering. On a one-price
basis, the total market revenue is at $5 million and the sum-total
consumer surplus reaches $2.5 million. However, in an efficient
price discrimination scheme, the business can vary its price according
to the value its customers receive from purchasing. If each customer
will see a price that is 30% less than the value that they receive
from the purchase, every customer will participate in this market
and both customers and the business are better off. In this case,
the total market revenue will rises above $7 million and the sum-total
consumer surplus rises above $3.0 million.
One Price
Total Revenue = $5000
Total Consumer Surplus - $2550
Variable Price at 30% of Customer Value
Total Revenue = $7070
Total Consumer Surplus - $3030
Surely a principle that leads to increases in the number of individuals
receiving consumer surplus and in the profits of the company producing
an output can’t be all bad. Perhaps it is simply the name
of this principle that discourages discussion. Any takers for “Surplus
Redistribution”?
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Author
Tim Smith, PhD is Editor of the Wiglaf Journal, Principal of Wiglaf
LLC, and Adjunct Professor at DePaul's Kellstadt Graduate School
of Business.
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