Performance
Based Contracting:
Performance Pitfalls and Structural Solutions in Outsourcing
by Justin Townsley, 9 July 2003
<back
| | next>
In the last article, we described how outsourcing
has spawned an industry aimed at making it more complicated, time/resource
intensive, and disposed to failure than necessary. We also observed
that the practices leading to these difficulties were contrary to
principles in contemporary quality management theory. In this article,
we’ll review in more detail the issues involved in outsourcing,
and how it can be made simple, fast, and successful. The article
is divided into two sections: 1) background, and 2) future. The
background section reviews the sourcing issue, the theoretical framework
for outsourcing, typical approaches, and problems and pitfalls.
The future section presents systems and structure analysis of outsourcing,
process re-engineering, our recommendations, implementation issues,
and case results.
Background
The Sourcing Issue can be presented as a question,
“How do I acquire the necessary inputs to my production process
at maximum value?” The question is deceptively simple, and
there are two classic answers: make or buy. Examining the issue
in greater detail, however, leads to interesting insights.
First and foremost, we must answer the underlying,
often ignored, and non-trivial question “What is value?”
Often, price is the only value component that is considered. This
limited view is only appropriate when the item being purchased is
a commodity, in the strictest definition of the word. That is, the
product quality, quantity, delivery point, delivery schedule, packaging,
payment terms, and every other possible consideration of differentiation
are standardized. Such a situation rarely exists; commodity contracts
are a clear example. Treatment of purchases as if they are commodities,
however, is overwhelmingly prevalent. Since outsourcing is only
reasonably applied to repeat purchases, or ongoing relationships,
this shortcoming is amplified when it occurs in outsourcing processes.
Beyond this matter, however, there are a significant
number of theories that can be applied to evaluate the outsourcing
process, the relationship that emerges, and the results that are
desired. Some of these are game theory, organization theory, agency
theory, systems theory, network theory, and complexity theory. An
article of this length is insufficient to go into theoretical underpinnings
thoroughly, but some of the points of interest will be presented
as we go along.
Game Theory.
An important touch point of outsourcing and game theory is the distinction
between one-time games and repeated games. One-time games are just
what they sound like: exchanges between participants who only meet
one time. One-time games are appropriate for purchase order types
of acquisition, rather than outsourcing contracts. They are clearly
applicable to commodity purchases (rare as those are). They typically
involve “zero-sum” situations in which a fixed value
is divided between participants. The process outcome often also
falls into what we call “Bid and Bash” procedures, and
mentality. This eliminates the possibility of building “present
value” from an ongoing relationship. It also typically overlooks
the explicit definition of the product (or service) being procured,
and the components of value in that product or service. It treats
the procurement as an entirely static event.
Unfortunately, because the analysis of one-time versus
repeated-game circumstances rarely takes place explicitly, too often
outsourcing applies the wrong theory to the process. For you game
theorists managing supply chains, outsourcing is a repeated game
environment. You must consider the present value leverage you can
gain through managing the relationship outcome just as the procurement
outcome is managed. Furthermore, you must take the time and effort
to explicitly define the product or service being procured, and
all the components of value that can be attributed to it. Only then
do you have a chance of delivering an outsourcing that is sufficiently
dynamic to meet the challenges you will present to it.
Organization Theory.
Organization theory is applied to a principal, classic question,
“What should be inside my organization and what should be
outside?” The classic answer is that when costs of managing
increasing complexity exceed transaction costs, the organization
should outsource. Alternatively, when the transaction costs exceed
the cost of managing internal complexity, insource. This is all
well and good except for a couple of points: 1) How can we know
what these costs really are? And 2) Even if we can know what they
are now, how can we know what they’ll be throughout the future?
Our answer to these questions is that the true costs, and the future,
are “unknown and unknowable” as Deming said most important
things are. Therefore, organization theory is of limited use in
this decision process.
Agency Theory.
From the perspective of agency (or contract) theory, the seminal
question is, “How do I get what I thought I bought, at the
price and terms I thought I agreed to, without spending all my time
looking over my supplier’s shoulder?” Depending on your
personal vocabulary and perspective, this can be considered a problem
with contracting, motivation, structure, or systems. In any event,
it presents the second fundamental problem clearly: typical approaches
to outsourcing contracts inherently produce perverse incentives,
adversarial relationships, and induce needless resource commitments
to “contract management.” This second fundamental problem
is also a compelling reason why outsourcing fails, or at best delivers
sub-optimal results.
The typical approaches referred to above are “Fixed
Price” and “Cost Plus….” It is to our detriment
that we do not specify “plus what?” The plus is “…
A Percentage of Cost.” It should be obvious that a repeated
game environment treated as a one-time game by its participants
(dictated by the outsourcer, not the outsourcee), will produce an
adversarial relationship. A fixed price agreement will incent the
supplier to cut corners; a cost plus agreement will incent the supplier
to overspend. In both approaches, the presence of the perverse incentive
results in excess resource commitment to contract management, which
we nickname “contract police.” The reasons for this
are the structural shortcomings with the agreement, and the failure
to adequately specify both the product and its value.
As a sidelight, lest readers think that the structure
of a contract does not affect behavior, be assured that it can;
whether it does or not depends partly on the contract and partly
on the circumstances. The following examples are useful.
“The Mayor of the French city of Le Lavandou
has banned its local residents from dying, as the town’s local
cemetery is full.” Fox News 8/27/02
The Sergey Bubka effect. “Ukrainian pole
vaulter Sergey Bubka earned $50,000 every time he set a new world
record. From 1983 to 1998 he set world records 35 times… never
by more than a quarter of an inch.” Internet research.
Systems Theory.
We will leave the realm of theory with this brief comment regarding
systems theory. A central part of this theory deals with feedback
loops, which can be positive (beneficial) or negative (harmful).
When the outsourcing process is short-circuited from the problems
cited above, negative feedback loops are built in and harm the outcome,
and the relationship.
As you will see below, the recommended approach solves
these problems and the foregoing ones, automatically aligns the
motives of suppliers with those of customers, and alleviates the
resource commitment to contract management, enabling customer staff
to concentrate on more important matters.
Future
Systems and Structure Analysis.
The problems with the typical approach, and results, can be summarized
as five undesirable conditions:
1. Typical approaches contain perverse incentives (or negative feedback
loops).
2. Product and value definition are taken for granted.
3. Customers aggregate expenses for supplier cost and profit.
4. Present value leverage (the ability to build a dynamic, improving,
relationship) is ignored.
5. A positive feedback loop is missing (this is different from point
1).
Process Re-engineering.
In order to resolve the shortcomings in the systems and structural
analysis, we have to accomplish five things through process re-engineering.
1. Remove the negative feedback loop.
2. Make product and value component definition explicit.
3. Get customers to treat expenses for supplier costs differently
than expenses for supplier profit.
4. Utilize present value leverage.
5. Add a positive feedback loop.
Recommendations.
The achievement of re-engineering objectives can be accomplished
as follows.
1. Fix the perverse incentives. Change the
fundamental contract structure to:
COST REIMBURSEMENT + FIXED FEE
This eliminates the perverse incentive in the structure, and forces
the profit-maximizing supplier to focus on maximizing present value
profitability. This is achieved by never getting fired. Present
value leverage (point 4) is therefore also resolved in this way.
We also recommend that the fixed fee included in this
portion of the agreement be somewhat below market norms, to keep
the supplier hungry for additional profit. The reason for this will
be clear in point 4, below.
2. Make the product and value explicit. Spend
the time, collaboratively, during the outsourcing process, and especially
during contract negotiations, to establish explicit definitions
for the product components and value axes. Investing in this time
at the front end of the process will pay enormous dividends in avoided
resource commitments, dissatisfaction, and sub-optimal performance
costs later.
3. Recognize that the supplier is a profit-maximizer.
This in reasonable, since few businesses are designed to be
otherwise. Therefore, consider what the customer can do to induce
supplier behavior to its own benefit, and reward that behavior with
additional profit. For example, the concept of shared savings induces
the supplier (in a cost reimbursement agreement) to reduce costs
in order to increase profits. The historic problem with shared savings
is that it is disconnected from customer satisfaction, which is
typically measured but not rewarded, so the incentive is weaker.
4. Add the positive feedback loop of a properly
structured incentive. After years of (sometimes painful) research,
we have evolved a structure that works extremely well: That structure
is:
SAVINGS x CUSTOMER SATISFACTION = BONUS
It should be clear that this entails additional important collaboration
during contract negotiations to establish both the process and instrument
by which customer satisfaction will be measured. This effort evolves
from the work to make the components of product and value explicit,
and is well worth the time and resources invested. We recommend
that the mechanics of this calculation be established so that the
supplier can earn a total fee, including its fixed fee, which is
above market, but only if it delivers a superior product (that is,
above market customer satisfaction at below market cost).
Implemenation Issues.
Having worked through this process repeatedly over the course of
12 years, we have identified some typical implementation issues
that bear mention. They have to do with relapse into the traditional,
and counter-productive mindset that causes outsourcing failure.
These are:
1. Adversarial relapse. Sometime during the
contract negotiation, the parties forget that they are supposed
to be collaborators working to a common good. This relapse must
be recognized and reversed, or the outcome is in jeopardy.
2. Static relapse. Also during contract negotiation,
the parties think that the contract will cover everything that can
happen; it won’t. Therefore, concentrate effort on how the
contract will govern resolution of unforeseen issues, rather than
establishing a static agreement and being forced to choose between
ignoring unforeseen issues, or starting the outsourcing process
all over again.
3. Zero-sum mentality. This tendency applies
across all the points in this section. So much of our business culture
and history is hard-wired with this concept that it crops up repeatedly
and forcefully. In some processes, we have had to appoint a “zero-sum
cop” whose only responsibility is to identify and eradicate
symptoms of this mindset.
4. Ratchet on incentive. At some point during
every contract negotiation, someone on the customer’s side,
frequently senior management, will say “Okay, we pay a bonus
on savings for this year, but then next year we start fresh and
they have to save more money all over again, right?” Wrong.
Savings that are identified and captured earn bonuses for as long
as they last, typically the length of the contract. There’s
a lengthy mathematical reason why, but the short answer is that
this approach costs the customer two years worth of benefits.
5. Focus on fee. At some point during the
contract term, someone on the customer’s side, frequently
senior management, will say “Okay, they’ve done a good
job, but the normal profit in their business is only X percent;
they’re making Y!” [Where Y is bigger.] Somebody has
to remind the customer that Y profit may be above X, but the total
cost of the contract is Z, which is well below the normal total
cost in the industry.
Results.
As I mentioned above, FourBridge Partners have been working in this
field for more than 12 years. We’ve honed our approach based
on study, and stubbed toes. During the first nine years of our efforts,
every agreement required some repair within the first six months
of its inception. During the last three years, however, every agreement
we’ve guided has worked without any repair, or even disagreement.
Volumes have been in billions, and the value improvements in hundreds
of millions.
---
Author:
Justin L. Townsley, Jr. is a Managing Partner at FourBridge Partners
LLP, a consultancy specializing in operational and organization
performance improvement for firms facing significant challenge.
jlt@fourbridge.com, (312)
560-1972
<back
| | next> |