Power Risks
California Power Problems Caused by Dumb Regulation, Not Deregulation
by Tim Smith, PhD, February 5, 2001
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Recent news concerning power outages have been of
dour amusement for this Chicagoan. Once again, a subset of people
(read: the state) is trying to tell another subset of people (read:
the utilities) how to live. In this case, it is what the prices
should be for retail electricity and what geographic markets they
serve. Although California touts itself as a liberal hotbed of the
New New Thing – all too often the state turns its focus into
delineating the acceptable from unacceptable - for instance, if
you can smoke in a bar or ride a motorcycle without a helmet. If
you want real freedom, stay in the Midwest where authors like William
S. Burroughs can write existentialist/dadaist novels in rural Lawrence,
Kansas (may his genius rest in peace), cigar bars proliferate, and
helmets are optional.
But back to energy – the current career of yours
truly.
The utilities of electricity and natural gas have
mostly been privatised in the U.S. but only recently have these
industries been able to enter freely into new markets under the
current push for deregulation. In the past, these utilities were
treated as a public good that operated best under a natural monopoly.
Accepting that the monopolies were natural, state governments in
all their wisdom set the rates at which the utilities could charge
for their goods of electrons in a wire or methane in a pipe. As
such, these monopolies acted wisely and negotiated their prices
with the state to be equal to the cost to serve plus an allowed
profit margin – an interesting rewrite of the basic business
truth to read P? = C + ?. For investors, this meant low risk and
low return while for the utilities this meant there were little
incentives to lower the cost structures, compete on customer service,
or brand their services. For consumers, residents and businesses
became expectant of uninterrupted power-on-the-tap.
Deregulation is changing all of this – and the
hope is that it is for the better. For most states, the first step
of deregulation is to separate the power generating activity from
the distribution and customer service aspects of the industry. Along
the paradigm that there are only three types of industries: creative,
relationship, and infrastructure, they have attempted to separate
the infrastructure portion of generating power from the relationship
portion of reading meters and billing customers. So far, so good.
But California mismatched the risks-to-reward portion
of business. Energy retailers like PG&E or Southern California
Edison must buy their inputs – power from the generator –
on the open market and pay the spot prices. The price they can charge
for their output - power to the consumer – is set by the state
and only changed through a rate-case with the government. When Southern
California Edison suggested that they should be able to enter into
long-term contracts for power to relieve themselves from the fluctuations
in the spot prices, the government said no! In the legislature’s
wisdom, this would have created an unnecessary barrier-to-entry
into the market. Thus, for the energy retailer, the firm that bills
consumers and buys power on the open market, their risks are high
and the rewards are still set by the state.
The results of this poor wisdom are now pathetically
obvious. True, the state has relieved its residents from higher
electricity bills but at the cost of rolling blackouts and the possible
bankrupting two of the strongest utilities in the U.S. In light
of these catastrophes, many states are reconsidering their intentions
for deregulation, but some more enlightened friends are pressing
forward.
The error wasn’t to deregulate electricity but
rather to prescribe the industry structure and prices. Because of
California’s error, they are now considering becoming the
power-broker of the state in buying energy from the generators and
reselling it to the retailers. The result will be a smoothing-out
of the price of raw power, but the cost will be that the government
will bare the risk and soak the taxpayers with the bill. Firms like
Enron have already proven highly capable of taking this role and
efficiently buying futures contracts to hedge against short-term
fluctuations raw fuel. May the Midwest get it right.
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Tim Smith, PhD is a principal at Wiglaf, a Market Research and Sales
and Marketing Strategy consultancy serving tech-driven businesses
operating in business markets. Small and medium sized businesses
select Wiglaf for our quantitative and fact driven approach. www.wiglaf.biz.
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"Power Risks, California Power Problems Caused
by Dumb Regulation, Not Deregulation", Timothy Smith, Chicago
Business, February 5, 2001, p9.
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